






















How INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORISTS
CAN BENEFIT BY READING THUCYDIDES
Often regarded as the father of realism in intemational relations,
Thucydides was a historian and an original political thinker who described
and analyzed social and political events that occurred during the Pelo-
ponnesian War, which broke out in 431 B.C. between Athens and Sparta.
Thucydides' masterpiece, the History of the Peloponnesian War is not a
work of political philosophy nor a sustained theory of intemational
politics. Much of the History consists of paired speeches by personages
who argue both sides of an issue. In these speeches and in Thucydides'
own comments on the events that take place, we can catch a glimpse of a
theory that is implied, but nowhere fully formulated or made explicit.
Although Thucydides implies that he exemplifies universal truths about
human nature, civil society, and interstate relationships, he does not
present this point of view explicitly, and never engages with other thinkers
in a debate.' Nevertheless, if the History is described as the only ac-
knowledged classical text in intemational relations, and if it inspires
theorists from Hobbes to contemporary intemational relations scholars,
this is because it is more than a chronicle of events, and a theoretical
position can be extrapolated from it.
The History of the Peloponnesian War is usually seen as an arche-
typal statement of power politics. Thucydides is regarded as a political
realist who asserts that the pursuit of moral principles does not enter the
world of intemational affairs.2 I want to show that, on the contrary, we
find in Thucydides a complex theory. He supports neither extreme
realism, in which intemational morality is denied, nor Utopian idealism
that overlooks the aspect of power in intemational relations. He is pro-
foundly interested in ethical issues in domestic and intemational politics.
Against the provocative title of the recent article of David Welch, "Why
Intemational Relations Theorists Should Stop Reading Thucydides,"^ I
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argue that both theorists and practitioners of intemational politics should
read Thucydides, and can greatly benefit by reading him.
Thucydides' Realism
The task that Thucydides sets for himself is not just to describe the
harsh events that occurred during the Peloponnesian War "and will always
happen as long as human nature remains the same" (3.82.2).'» As he says
on its opening pages, the History is not a piece of writing designed to meet
the taste of the immediate public, but is meant to last forever. He is not
merely interested in reconstructing historical events, using the best
evidence available, but in providing their general explanation. His work is
essentially a study of human and state behavior, in which a theory is
implied and permanent characteristics of human affairs and intemational
politics are revealed. Because of his pessimism about human nature, his
emphasis on power, and his recognition that morality has little place in
inter-state relations, he is often credited with being the first writer in the
tradition of political realism.^
What is realism? Realism is a view of intemational politics that
stresses its competitive and conflicting side.* The principal actors in the
intemational arena are states that are concemed with their own security,
act in pursuit of their national interests, and stmggle for power. Thucy-
dides seems to subscribe to this view. Distinguishing between immediate
and underlying causes of the Peloponnesian War, he does not see its un-
derlying cause in the Athenian intervention in the conflict between
Corcyra and Corinth, her siege of Potidaea, or her ban on trade with
Megara—the events that occurred immediately before its outbreak. He
locates the root of the war in the changing distribution of power between
the two blocks of Greek city-states: the Delian League and the Pelopon-
nesian League. According to him, the growth of Athenian power made the
Spartans fear for their security, and thus compelled them into war (1.23.6).
What he says resonates strongly with realist arguments on how the
anarchic stmcture of the intemational system affects the behavior of
states. The realists find the absence of a mler, literally anarchy, the
defining element of intemational politics and primary determinant of in-
temational political outcomes. The lack of a mle-making and enforcing
common authority means, they claim, that each state is responsible for its
survival and is free to define its own power interests. In the worlds of the
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Athenian envoys at Melos, if there is no intemational govemment that can
enforce order, "the independent states survive [only] when they are
powerful" (5.97.2). Intemational anarchy leads thus to the overriding role
of power in inter-state relations and causes all states to be motivated by
fear and mutual distmst. To attain security, states increase their relative
power and engage in power balancing for the purpose of deterring potential
aggressors. Wars are fought to prevent any competing nations from becoming
militarily stronger.
The negative side of this emphasis on power is the realists' skepti-
cism regarding the applicability of universal ethical norms to relations
among states. National politics is the realm of authority and law, whereas
intemational politics, unrestrained by any higher moral laws, is a sphere
without justice characterized by active or potential conflict between states.
A confirmation of this position can again be found in the "Melian
Dialogue" (5.85-113). This dialogue relates to the events of 416 B.C.,
when Athens invaded the neutral island of Melos. The Athenian envoys
present the Melians with a choice between destmction or surrender, eind
from the outset ask them not to appeal to justice, but to think about their
survival. They say: "We both know that the decisions about justice are
made in human discussions only when both sides are under equal com-
pulsion, but when one side is stronger, it gets as much as it can, and the
weak must accept that" (5.89). To be "under equal compulsion" means to
be subjected to a common authority. Since such an authority above states
does not exist, the Athenians argue that the only right in the world of
anarchy is the right of the stronger to dominate the weaker. They explic-
itly equate right with might, and exclude considerations of justice from
foreign affairs. Further, the right of the stronger to dominate is for them a
natural law. "Nature always compels gods (we believe) and men (we are
certain) to mle over anyone they can control" (5.105.2). Hence, in the
Athenian speech there is implied not only a denial of intemational morals,
but also a certain view of humankind that is essential for the realist view
of intemational politics. Intemational anarchy would not lead to conflict
between nations if they were all populated by angels. Whether explicitly,
as in classical realism, or implicitly, as in neorealism, the realistic theory
premises an egoistic human nature.^ Human beings are perceived as self-
interested and power-seeking, moved by the drive to dominate others, and
not influenced by either compassion or any moral mles.
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Realism is implied in the statements of the Athenian envoys at Melos
and in the way Thucydides explains the cause of the Peloponnesian War.
Moreover, the same outlook of intemational politics is expressed in the
very first speech given by the Athenians in the History, namely, at the
debate at Sparta, just before the outbreak of the war. The Athenians refer
to three motives that have led them to obtain and keep their empire: fear,
honor, and self-interest (1.75.3; 1.76.2). A similar motivational triad can
be found in Hobbes's Leviathan and in twentieth-century realists.^ Nearly
all realists place fear at the core of state motivation. Fear is a defensive
motive, based on the desire for self-preservation; however, honor and self-
interest, desires for recognition and gain, are fundamentally competitive
and acquisitive. These three motives are paralleled in Pericles' "last
Speech" as safety, glory, and wealth (2.63-64). Athenian imperialism is
thus justified on the grounds of security concems, recognition, and expe-
diency, but not on moral grounds. Further, the Athenians affirm the
priority of power over justice in intemational relations and provide justi-
fication for this. They argue that morality cannot be put ahead of power
because as a mle "the weaker are held by the stronger" (1.76.2). No one
who can obtain something by power will be deterred not to use it. To
believe otherwise, they suggest, would be to mislead oneself about the
nature of intemational politics.
The Athenians give then strong support to a realist position. The
question is, however, to what extent the view of Athenian realism
coincides with Thucydides' own viewpoint. Is his realism the same as the
realism of the Athenian envoys at Melos and of the Athenians at the
debate at Sparta? Is he a realist at all? Thucydides' History provides an
account of debates between groups and individuals, holding often
opposite views. The political discourse that he describes is plural, not
single. Although fragments of the "Melian Dialogue" and other parts of
the Peloponnesian War support a realist reading, Thucydides' realism
cannot be deduced from selected fragments but must be assessed on the
basis of the wider context of his book. The "Melian Dialogue" itself
provides us with a plurality of contending perspectives.
Realism Versus Idealism in the Melian Dialogue
Political realism is usually contrasted with idealism or liberalism, a
theoretical perspective that puts stress on intemational norms, interdepen-
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dence between states, and intemational cooperation.' The "Melian
Dialogue," which is one of the most frequently commented upon parts of
Thucydides' History, presents the classic dilemma between idealist and
realist thinking: Can intemational politics be based on a moral order
derived from the principles of peace and justice or will it remain the play-
ground of conflicting national interests and power?
For the Melians, who employ idealistic arguments, the choice is
between war and subjection (5.86). They do not wish to lose their
freedom, and in spite of the fact that they are militarily weaker than the
Athenians, they are prepared to defend themselves (5.100; 5.112). They
base their arguments on an appeal to justice (5.86), and refuse to concede
that justice is a mere matter of expediency, but understand it as a universal
moral principle. They associate justice with faimess, and regard the
Athenians as unjust (5.90; 5.104). Also, they put their tmst in alliances
and hope for military assistance from their ally, Sparta. They respect the
gods and believe in honor, saying that their weakness will be made up by
the aid of the gods supporting their just cause and the help of the Spartans,
whom they hold to be honorable (5.104; 5.112). Hence, in the speech of
the Melians one can identify such elements of the idealistic or liberal
world view as the beliefs that nations have the right to exercise political
independence, states have mutual obligations to one another that they will
carry out, and the war of aggression is unjust.
The Athenian response is based on such key realist concepts as
security and power, and is informed not by what the world should be but
what it is. The Athenians urge the Melians to look at the facts, namely to
recognize their military inferiority, to consider the potential consequences
of their decision, and to think about their own survival (5.87; 5.101). They
exclude consideration of justice from their discussion and appeal to the
identity of interests. (5.89; 5.91). They are concemed about their security
and express fear that the independent Melos may endanger them (5.99).
They argue that it will be better for both sides if Melos gives in. The
Melians will save themselves from min and the Athenians will reap profits
from them (5.93). Melos will add to the empire and no longer be a
potential security threat (5.97). Furthermore, the Athenians describe the
honor and justice of the Spartans, to which the Melians refer, as mere
hypocrisy that masks the Spartan interests. Considering the Athenian
power and the risk of military action, they claim that it is foolish to believe
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Sparta will ever come to help and fight for Melos (5.105; 5.109). They
advise the Melians not to be distracted by a false notion of honor, which
in the absence of strength can only bring them disaster and the dishonor
of defeat, or to depend on mere hopes, but to think only about their own
country and how to survive in the present circumstances (5.111).
In spite of these realist arguments, the Melians refuse to submit and
decide to fight for their independence. After some initial successes on
their part, the Athenian siege succeeds. The Melians pay the highest price
for their choice. Melian men of military age are killed. Women and
children are sold into slavery. Melos loses statehood after seven hundred
years of her history. The island is repopulated by Athenian colonists. This
tragic story shows that in the end a theory of intemational relations
"involves the ultimate experience of life and death, national existence and
national extinction."'" It is a practical theory, the theory of survival. In the
first recorded debate between idealism and realism, realism is the winner,
if not by the strength of arguments, then clearly by the force of the
Athenian army. There are, nevertheless, reasons to believe that Thucy-
dides does not accept the "radical realism" advocated by the Athenians at
Melos. The Athenians do not act as his mouthpiece. Equally, he does not
identify his position with the "utopian idealism" represented by the
Melians. Both positions reveal serious theoretical weaknesses.
The Melians put high value on courage and honor, and love their
country. They have a sense of justice and respect alliances. They are thus
in a sense virtuous people. Some of their values resemble those of the
Athenians from the earlier period. In one of his speeches, Pericles, the
Athenian leader, who dies in the early stage of the War, says that for
people who have a choice, to go to war is always a folly. However, when
the choice is either to submit to neighbors or to take on dangers to
preserve independence, it is better to fight (2.61.1). Contending that not to
resist subjugation would be cowardly and shameful, the Melians make the
same choice that Pericles suggests and that the Athenians once made
themselves when, displaying great courage, they stood alone against the
overwhelming might of Persia (1.73-74). The element that they, never-
theless, lack and that does not allow them to be victorious is what Pericles
describes as a "strategy based on reality which affords predictable results"
(2.62.5). Although they are courageous, the Melians lack resources and
foresight. They are guided more by their hopes than by the evidence at
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hand and pmdent calculations. They appeal to justice, which is not
listened to, and call for help from outside, which cannot be obtained. Ul-
timately, they are good and courageous, but politically naive. The kind of
Utopian idealism that they display leads, because of their lack of good
judgment, foresight, and intelligent planning, to martyrdom: the death of
combatants and the extreme suffering of civilians, and in the end to the de-
stmction of their political community. Idealism of those who are unable to
survive is for Thucydides of no use, and is reported by him solely as a
waming against any future political wishful thinking. All the noble aspi-
rations of the Melians are mined because they do not take into
consideration the actual practice of states and do not make provision for
their own security.
The Athenians at Melos reveal themselves as models of rational self-
interested agents. They use available means to realize the objectives that
they set out. There is a seemingly powerful realist logic behind the
Athenian arguments. Their position, based on security concems and ex-
pediency, possesses rationality, intelligence, and foresight. However, on
close examination their logic contains serious flaws. Melos, a relatively
weak state, does not pose any real security threat to them. Their slaughter
of the Melians is a tragic error. The destmction of Melos does not change
the course of the Peloponnesian War, which is lost by Athens a few years
later. The Athenians argue that the intemational world, imperfect as it is,
is mled by the law that the weaker are dominated by the stronger, and
therefore, moral values cannot be applied to it. They do not only ac-
knowledge the lack of justice in inter-state relations, but also prescribe to
states the way of domination. Their radical realism is not merely descrip-
tive and defensive, but normative and offensive, and can be better termed
as realpolitik.^^ On the grounds of the purported lack of universal moral
standards in intemational politics and selfishness of states, the Athenians
glorify war and conquest, and act accordingly. They replace moral norms
with raison d'etat, state's expediency, as the highest norm. However, they
do not recognize that self-interest and the mles of might alone cannot
provide sufficient basis for a practical theory of intemational politics. In
his History, Thucydides shows that if it is unrestrained by moderation and
a sense of justice, power brings about the uncontrolled desire for more
power. There are no logical limits to the size of an empire. Dmnk with the
prospect of glory and gain after they conquer Melos, the Athenians engage
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in the war against Sicily. They do not pay attention to the Melian argument
that considerations of justice are useful to all in the longer run (5.90). As
they overestimate their strength and finally lose the war, the Athenian self-
interested logic is indeed very short-sighted.
It is Utopian to ignore the selfishness of states and be blind to the
reality of power in intemational relations, but it is equally blind to rely on
power alone. Thucydides would support neither naive idealism nor
cynical realpolitik. If he can still be regarded as a political realist, his
realism is neither realpolitik, in which intemational morality is denied,
nor neorealism, in which moral questions are largely ignored. His realism
is neither immoral nor amoral. In his realism, selfishness is recognized,
but is not exalted and presented as a value. Moderation and a sense of
justice should keep states from becoming too opportunistic in defining and
pursuing their interests. Thucydides' realism can be compared to that of
Raymond Aron, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans Morgenthau, the twentieth-
century classical realists, who, although sensible to the demands of power
and national interest, would not deny that political actors on the intema-
tional scene come under moral judgment.'^ He is profoundly engaged in
reflecting on ethical issues in domestic and intemational politics.
Politics and Ethics
While discussing the violent events that occurred at Corcyra during
the civil war (3.82-85), Thucydides attributes the growing wickedness,
not only at Corcyra but in the whole Hellenic world, to factionalism and
the deterioration of moral uprightness (3.83.1-2). Because it is ridiculed,
modesty, the simple virtue found in noble natures, disappears. The
excessive desire to mle out of selfishness, greed, and personal ambition
prevails (3.82.6). Society becomes divided into two opposing camps.
Contending political parties promote their policies under fair-sounding
slogans, like "equality for all" or "limited govemment," pretending thus
to serve the public, but in fact they stmggle for power without any con-
sideration for justice and the common good (3.82.7). Whatever means to
win is used, and both sides commit the most horrible atrocities against one
another. People go to every extreme. Oaths are not kept. There is no dis-
respect for piety. Revenge is admired. There is even a revolution in
language. Words take on new meanings (3.82.4-5). Acts of thoughtless
aggression are described as courageous. Moderation is held to be a cloak
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for unmanliness. Plotting becomes a justifiable means of defense. Moreover,
factionalism tums into the most overwhelming factor. The attributes of
being a real man are now partisanship and violent fanaticism. Party mem-
bership becomes a stronger tie than that of the family. Those who wish to
stay as neutral in the middle are destroyed (3.82.8). No argument is strong
enough to convince the sides to terminate their mutual hostility.
The civil war in Corcyra is the paradigm of social disintegration.
There are many similarities between the events that take place in Corcyra
and the later revolution in Athens that leads to overthrowing democracy
and establishing oligarchy (8.65-71). For Thucydides the polis is not an
abstract entity that has laws of its own. The state cannot be separated from
the human beings composing the society. Even if a state can be regarded
as a legal abstraction, it is not the state that makes decisions, but individ-
uals. This is why most of Thucydides' ethical words and phrases are used
interchangeably to describe individuals and states. His ethical concems,
far from being an expression of abstract thinking, are related to the actual
conditions in which states are found. A virtuous political body depends on
good qualities of its individual members, and above all on the quality of
its leadership. A bad one is cormpted by vice. The disintegration of
society that occurs in both Corcyra and Athens is described by such
negative ethical words and phrases as 'injustice', 'selfishness', 'greed',
'disregard for piety', 'faction', 'arrogance', 'envy', 'revenge', 'deceit',
'fear', 'cowardice', and 'cmelty'.'^ The laudable characteristics of both
individual character and a virtuous society, such as respect for law,
tolerance, openness, courage, moderation, justice, foresight, self-control,
cautious deliberation, pmdence, and fratemity, which we can find in
Pericles' "Funeral Oration" (2.35-46), in which he describes the Athenian
democracy, are absent.
Pericles' Athens stands in Thucydides' History for the supreme
achievements of civilization: material, political, and ethical. By contrast,
Athens of the revolution £ind the oligarchic mle following it, is a model of
political and moral decline. In his famous oration, Pericles suggests that
the Athenian democracy is a good constitution because it allows the
admirable individual and public qualities that he mentions to flourish. He
himself displays such prime qualities of character as moderation,
foresight, pmdence, good judgment, independence of thought and action,
and incormptibility, and it is during his leadership that Athens reaches the
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peak of its greatness (2.65). Nevertheless, in Pericles' speeches there are
also the germs of vice that infect Athens and bring about her downfall.
Since it produces immoderate individuals, Thucydides suggests, the
excessive love of power in intemational politics will remove all restraint
from domestic politics as well.'* Pericles inspires Athenian imperial
ambitions and appeals to glory, which ultimately leads the Athenians to
excess (2.62-64). The ancient modesty or simplicity, which can be asso-
ciated with a certain sense of limit, disappears not only from the Corcyran,
but also from the Athenian character. The successors of Pericles do not
follow his cautious and intelligent war policy but manage the state for
their private ambition and private gain (2.65.7). They are not, like
Pericles, leaders of public opinion, but striving for popularity, they form
policies to suit the whims of the people, regardless of whether these
policies are actually good for the state (2.5.10). Ultimately this results in
a terrible defeat of the Athenians in Sicily and the oligarchic revolution
that follows.
The contrast that Thucydides expresses between Pericles and his suc-
cessors, and between the Athens of Pericles and the Athens of revolution,
suggests that material and political achievements of society are insepara-
ble from its morals. Politics is not merely a matter of some stmctural
considerations, but is related to ethics. The state of different communities
may range from a supremely civilized community, based on virtue,
downwards to a society degraded by vice and tom apart by civil strife.
Thucydides'History as "Lasting Possession"
Thucydides' History was meant by him to be a "lasting possession."
It would be erroneous, however, to identify that what he wanted to convey
to posterity was a narrow realist theory of intemational relations. His
realism refuses to be confined to the narrow realm of security and power,
but takes into account the whole political reality with its ideas, passions,
and follies.15 He neither denies intemational morals nor, like today's neo-
realists, ignores them in the name of pretended scientific objectivity. On
the contrary, in the Peloponnesian War, unlike the writings of most
realists, we can find a deep reflection on ethics in its relation to politics.
In much the same way as a physician who pronounces his diagnosis,
Thucydides examines the causes of political disorder and studies the ways
in which ethical characteristics of a state, or their lack, affect its condition.'*
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Like other ancient Greek writers before and after him, such as Hesiod,
Solon, Aeschylus, as well as Plato and Aristotle, he considers the lack of morals
to be a serious disease of the polis. In this way he is a part of the Hellenic
moral tradition in which Westem political philosophy is deeply rooted.
One of the main issues that Thucydides considers is the effect of
power when it is not kept within the bounds of moderation and justice in
both domestic and intemational politics. Although he never precisely
defines justice, it is clear that this and other ethical concepts are for him
neither culturally nor historically relative. The absence of justice as a
universal moral value is always lamentable. A society that leaves no room
for justice and moderation, that knows no law and no limit, Thucydides
concludes, is doomed to fail. Humans are rational actors only in a super-
ficial way. At a deeper level, lacking a sense of justice and moderation,
they become fundamentally irrational and their irrationality destroys their
understanding of what is expedient for them. They often leam moderation
only by defeat. The Athenians finally lose the war because, moved by the
love of power alone, they overestimate their strength, develop poor policies,
and choose wrong leaders. As numerous other examples from world
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